

15 OCTOBER, Monday

1. Met with DCI and McGeorge Bundy, 0900-1100, at White House. (See M/R, dated 16 October, "Recon Flights of Cuba, " on these command and control problems.)
2. Lunched with Senator Stennis at 1230 in his office. (M/R re this meeting: "Our conversation centered almost entirely on the Soviet buildup in Cuba and I brought him up to date in specific detail, as I did with Senator Saltonstall. The rest of the conversation was almost entirely conjectural as to where we might go from here . . ." M/R, dtd 15 Oct 62, ER 62-7556.)
3. DCI left for West Coast at 1500. Prior to his departure, I sent Memo to him attaching all papers re discussions of Cuban overflights. (Attached under 12 October.)
4. Briefing by Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey for Special Group (augmented) and Special Group Meeting for 16 October.
5. Late on 15 October, I was informed that the latest readout from Cuban U-2 photography indicates initial deployment of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles, and I immediately authorized the dissemination of this information on a very limited need-to-know basis to IB members and their immediate commanders.

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16 OCTOBER (Tuesday)
(Acting DCI)

1. Attended Special Group (Augmented) at 0930 in Situation Room of White House and proposed nine various sabotage actions which received general approval except for those having a flavor of "naval warfare" which appeared to need a closer look. All were approved, with exception of one, the following day by the President through Mr. Bundy. (See three attachments.)
2. Dick Helms attended MONGOOSE meeting at 1430 at which the Attorney General opened the meeting by expressing the "general ^{dis-}satisfaction of the President" with Operation MONGOOSE. The Attorney General spoke favorably of the sabotage paper which I presented that morning to the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). The Attorney General called for daily meetings beginning the next day. (See attachment.)
3. Briefed NSC Meeting at 1145 at White House on what we saw in pix. Enlarged upon by Lundahl and [redacted]. President authorized as many U-2 flights as necessary. (See attached M/R dated 17 October.)
4. Met again at 1830 with President. Had additional information from Wheelon on NIC/GMAIC work.
5. General Hall chaired Watch Committee. Sheldon attended (it is believed). (Per Watch Report: "Soviet flag dry cargo vessels are continuing to deliver military equipment to Cuba. The total number of identified surface-to-air missile sites being constructed and operated by Soviet personnel has been increased to 20." "Ten probable Soviet IL-28 twin-jet light bombers (combat radius of about 700 nm) arrived in Cuba [redacted] on approximately 1 October; from then, several weeks would be required to assemble them. There are now at least 25 MIG-21s in Cuba . . . We still have noted no evidence that Cuban personnel are being trained in the operation of SAM equipment or of the coastal-defense. . .")
6. The Director scheduled to arrive at Airport at 2130 - General Carter to meet and to return to East Building for meeting.

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Conversation Between General Carter and Roger Hilsman on 16 October 1962

General Carter: I just got back to the office and heard the quote that was going around the Agency that you had said, in going in to see Dean Rusk, that you had to report a tremendous failure on the part of U. S. intelligence -- I don't know whether it's true or not, it's true in part, but I thought you should also know that Dean Rusk, at the meeting this morning, said, substantially along these lines, "This is really no surprise, Mr. McCone alerted us to it in mid-August." Which he had done and which he put in a message to me when he was on his honeymoon, bringing it up.

Mr. Hilsman: Well, I don't know -- funny, I don't recall saying anything in going in to see Dean Rusk. Oh, maybe when your fellow was listening, what I said was none of us, with the notable exception of McCone, really expected this, and I think none of the Sovietologists --

General Carter: That's true, nobody expected it except Mr. McCone. Incidentally, if there isn't any secretary listening on your line, you'd be interested in Bobby's reaction -- "Oh, s---!"

Mr. Hilsman: No, but what I was saying to the Secretary, quite sincerely, was that I did not expect it.

General Carter: Well, none of our people did either.

Mr. Hilsman: None of my Sovietologists did.

General Carter: Our psychiatrists over here didn't even expect it. OK, Roger --

Mr. Hilsman: Mr. McCone's the only one who can claim to have foreseen this because -- I didn't expect it, and it was -- nor did any of the other Sovietologists --

General Carter: Well, my only claim to fame is that in June I wrote a memo to Mr. McCone and said, "What's going to happen if such and such happens, are we ready for it?", you know -- this, however, referred to the early August stuff and not the current stuff, so I can't claim a damn thing -- but Mr. McCone really had it pegged; he's coming in, incidentally.

Mr. Hilsman: Well, I'm frank to admit that I did not expect this.

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General Carter: OK, coach, lots of things are going on around here --

Mr. Hilsman: Yes, I imagine.

General Carter: I'll see you.

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16 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: MONGOOSE Meeting with the Attorney General

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1. At 2:30 this afternoon, the Attorney General convened in his office a meeting on Operation MONGOOSE consisting of General Lansdale and [] General Johnson of the Joint Staff, Robert Hurwitch of State (vice Ed Martin who was unable to attend), Hewson Ryan of USIA, and the undersigned.

2. The Attorney General opened the meeting by expressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with Operation MONGOOSE. He pointed out that the Operation had been under way for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice. He indicated that there had been noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of intelligence but that other actions had failed to influence significantly the course of events in Cuba. He spoke of the weekly meetings of top officials on this problem and again noted the small accomplishments despite the fact that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and he personally had all been charged by the President with finding a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personal appointment by the President a year ago. The Attorney General then stated that in view of this lack of progress, he was going to give Operation MONGOOSE more personal attention. In order to do this, he will hold a meeting every morning at 0930 with the MONGOOSE operational representatives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwitch, Ryan, and General Johnson).

3. The Attorney General spoke favorably of the sabotage paper which had been presented by General Carter this morning to the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). He obviously did not like the earlier memorandum, since he felt it showed no "push" in getting on with the acts of sabotage.

4. When asked for my comments, I stated that we were prepared to get on with the new action program and that we would execute it aggressively. I pointed out, however, that the objective of Operation MONGOOSE would have to be determined at some point since the Cubans

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with whom we have to work were seeking a reason for risking their lives in these operations. I retailed my conversation with the young Cuban from the DRE who pointed out that they were willing to commit their people only on operations which they regarded as sensible. I defined "sensible" in Cuban terminology these days as meaning an action which would contribute to the liberation of their country, another way of saying that the United States, perhaps in conjunction with other Latin countries, would bail them out militarily. My point was specifically echoed by Hewson Ryan. The Attorney General's rejoinder was a plea for new ideas of things that could be done against Cuba. In passing, he made reference to the change in atmosphere in the United States Government during the last twenty-four hours, and asked some questions about the percentage of Cubans whom we thought would fight for the regime if the country were invaded.

5. The meeting concluded with the reaffirmation by the Attorney General of his desire to hold a meeting each day, beginning tomorrow. He said that these meetings might later be changed to every other day when and if he finds a daily get-together is not necessary. The meetings are to last no more than one-half hour.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:

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